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(SUR) technique. We find that the capitalisation response to increases in insolvency risk is more 
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a substitutional effect for the case of conventional banks, but a complementary effect for Islamic banks. 
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We examine the risk, capitalisation and efficiency relationship for IBs/CBs. 
IBs show a stronger capitalisation response to increases in insolvency risk. 
The risk mitigation effect of capitalisation is muted for Islamic banks. 
Changes in efficiency have different impact on the IB/CB risk profiles. 
Efficiency complements capitalisation in mitigating risk only in IBs.
1. Introduction 
During the last two decades the global banking industry has experienced continual transformations due 
to various environmental trends including new technologies, deregulation, the globalization of the 
economy and economic integration. These forces have led to increased financial integration and 
competition in the financial services industry; this increased concentration in the banking sector coupled 
with the problems of the recent financial crises has intensified public policy debates about banking 
regulatory environment and whether existing rules make financial sectors more efficient and stable. The 
importance of efficiency in banking in general has gained momentum, the result of which has pushed 
banks to operate closer to the “best practice” banks, which operate in close proximity to the efficient 
production frontier. Thus, when all banks operate in parallel with each other to achieve higher efficiency 
levels, competition and market concentration increases which could lead – at least in the short term – 
to greater risk-taking behaviour (Hellman et al., 2000; Altunbas et al., 2007; Fiordelisi et al., 2011a). 
These banks are deemed riskier because increased competition reduces the market power of banks, 
which leads to a decrease in their charter values. Furthermore, a decline in bank charter value combined 
with banks' limited liability and a rather flat-rate deposit insurance encourages banks to take more risks 
(Matutates and Vives, 2000; Salas and Saurina, 2003; Goddard and Wilson, 2009; Fiordelisi et al., 
2011b). Financial regulators have tried to offset risky behaviour by emphasizing upon capital adequacy 
in the prudential regulatory process as identified in the Basel III proposal.1 Capital adequacy 
requirement affects bank efficiency, which has proven to be one of the most direct contributors to 
financial stability via its effects on bank failures, future problem loans, and risk-taking (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997; Podpiera and Weill, 2008; Podpiera and Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2008; Fiordelisi et al., 
2011b). However, this prudential regulation could also have a downside, which raises a concern with 
regards to its implementation (Pessarossi et al., 2015). Higher capital ratios might impose trade-offs in 
terms of liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009), lending, and output growth (Angelini et al., 
2011; BCBS, 2009).  
The existing theoretical literature on the determinants of bank risk-taking and efficiency, and more 
specifically, studies examining the relationship between a bank’s capital and risk positions often yield 
differing expectations. One reason as cited by Altunbas et al. (2007) is that most of the hypotheses are 
non-exclusive. For instance, agency cost and  information asymmetry problems may have a significant 
impact on trade-offs between risk and bank capital (Jensen, 1986; Berger, 1995) and this explains why 
some institutions may react to the increased requirements of capital by taking on more risk, while others 
may reduce leverage. Determining which effect dominates is an empirical question.. 
The relationship between bank risk, capital and efficiency is not a straightforward one, therefore the 
three need to be examined together.2 (Altunbas et al., 2007) and (Fiordelisi et al., 2011) examine this 
triple relationship in the European banking sector and find a positive relation between capitalisation and 
efficiency. By contrast, (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006) only investigate capital and efficiency 
for US banks find evidence of an inverse relationship.3 These studies report contradictory findings: 
                                                          
1 For example, the Basel Committee focus on reforms that intend to raise the quality and quantity of the regulatory capital base 
and enhance the risk coverage of the capital adequacy framework (Basel Committee, 2011). 
2 Another reason necessitating the simultaneous examination of these variables is that most of the hypothesis are non-exclusive 
(Altunbas et al., 2007). For instance, agency cost and  information asymmetry problems may have a significant impact on 
trade-offs between risk and bank capital (Berger, 1995; Jensen, 1986) and this explains why some institutions may react to the 
increased requirements of capital by taking on more risk, while others may reduce leverage. 
3 We are aware that (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997) examine capital, risk and efficiency documenting an inverse relationship 
between capital and efficiency. We are mindful, however of (Altunbas et al., 2007) note on the (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997) 
data limitations. Other reasons for the inconsistency between EU and US studies may include the greater shareholder pressure 
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Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) find that lower capital ratios are associated with higher efficiency, 
whereas Fiordelisi et al. (2011b) find the opposite. 
Given that the aforementioned literature provides contradictory predictions and the evidence on the 
relationship between capital, risk and efficiency remains non-inclusive, we resort to empirical analysis. 
In this paper, we explore the role of capitalization on risk-taking behaviour of two different types of 
banks: Islamic and conventional. The emergence of Islamic banking, a banking system consistent with 
Shariah principles4, is an important development in the financial world. While the purpose of IBs is 
akin to that of CBs, standard loan and deposit products are fundamentally different, because of the 
prohibition of interest (riba) in Islam. IBs are not allowed to offer a fixed rate and are expected to 
conduct operations on the basis of profit-sharing arrangements or other modes of financing permissible 
under Islamic law. Despite growing pains and a loss of confidence in global financial systems, Islamic 
finance has continued to show rapid growth. The industry’s assets reached $2 trillion at year-end 2016 
(S&P Global Rating , 2017 ).Between 2006 and 2011, the volume of Shariah-compliant assets doubled 
to USD 900 billion (Oakley, 2010). Although Shariah-compliant financial assets constitute a small 
portion of total global banking assets (1.5%), its rapid growth has been noted by academics, policy 
makers and practitioners (e.g., Sundarajan and Errico, 2002; Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Beck et al., 2013).  
IBs are characterized by substantial differences compared to conventional ones, especially as far as 
deposit agreements are concerned. From the liabilities side, the principle of profit and loss sharing (PLS) 
is applied through profit sharing investment accounts (PSIA), which are specific to IBs. Unlike CBs 
deposits, the contractual relationship between IBs and investment account holders (IAH), i.e. the PSIA 
holders called mudarabah, is based on the concept of PLS. IBs share their profits or loss with these 
account holders. Because of this quasi equity, IBs are expected to take lower risks in comparison to 
their peer counterparts. Hence, changes in the capital structure of IBs may not end up stimulating effects 
which are identical to those expected in the conventional system (i.e., lower risk exposure, although 
this needs to be verified in our context).    
Our paper contributes to the related literature in three ways. First, we allow for a fourth factor - the 
business model, which is known to affect bank risk (Berger et al., 2010; DeAngelo and Stulz, 2015). 
To do so, we compare conventional and Islamic banks, the latter as a proxy for a banking system that 
is substantially different. DeAngelo and Stulz, (2015) offer a comparison of regulated and unregulated 
(shadow) banks and conclude that the business model (most notably through regulatory leverage limits) 
of the former impedes their ability to compete with the latter. Even though this may be an extreme 
example as all banks in our sample are regulated, there is a substantial literature highlighting the 
distinctiveness of conventional and Islamic banks with respect to financial profile (Olson and Zoubi, 
2017, 2008), profitability and asset growth (Hasan and Dridi, 2011), asset quality and capitalisation 
(Beck et al., 2013), technical efficiency (Johnes et al., 2014) cost efficiency (Saeed and Izzeldin, 2016), 
credit risk (Abedifar et al., 2013), insolvency risk (Čihák and Hesse, 2010), failure risk (Pappas et al., 
2017), loan default rates (Baele et al., 2014) and accounting practices (Elnahass et al., 2014) among 
                                                          
and the markedly different regulatory environments between EU and US (Altunbas et al., 2007). An updated examination of 
this triple-relationship in US context (as (Altunbas et al., 2007) have highlighted) might be useful direction for future research.   
4 Islamic law (Shariah) lays down a set of well-defined rules governing economic behavioural relationships. In addition the 
prohibition of interest (the Arabic term is Riba), there are rules covering individual and property rights; buyer and seller 
behaviour in the market; the right and enforce ability of contracts; and the role of the state. For descriptions of the Islamic 
economic system, see Mirakhor (1987), “The Economic System in an Islamic Society” Middle East Insight (August/September 




others.5 Second, with the exception of slight similarity with the studies by Alam (2012) and Bitar (2016) 
and Bitar (2018) , this is the first study to examine the triple-relationship between bank risk, capital and 
efficiency for Islamic banks. Third, we examine the triple relationship between bank risk, capital and 
efficiency for a worldwide sample of banks.  
In this paper we examine the triple-relationship between bank risk, capital and efficiency for 
conventional and Islamic banks, using data over the 2000 – 2012 period from 14 countries. We 
investigate insolvency risk and credit risk, which are proxied by the z-score and Loan Loss Provisions 
/ Total Loans respectively. Capitalisation is proxied by the ratio of Equity to Assets. We estimate both 
cost and profit efficiency using stochastic frontier analysis similar to (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Our system 
of three equations is subsequently estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method 
that allows for simultaneity between the dependent variables.  
We find that the capitalisation response to increases in insolvency risk is more pronounced for Islamic 
banks but has an approximately five-times smaller effect on risk mitigation compared to conventional 
banks. Higher cost efficiency is related to lower risk for conventional banks, but the opposite is true for 
Islamic banks. The link between cost efficiency and capitalisation attests to a substitutional effect for 
the case of conventional banks, but a complementary effect for Islamic banks. Our findings give new 
insights on the use of efficiency to gauge capital requirements for financial institutions and are 
particularly relevant for regulators and policy makers in countries where both bank types operate. Our 
results are confirmed through a series of robustness tests. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature and theoretical 
framework.  Sections 3 and 4 present the methodology and data respectively. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the results. A final section concludes and presents the study implications.  
 
2 Theoretical Framework and Related literature 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
2.1.1 CB- IB Structural Differences & Implications on Risk-Capital-Efficiency Behaviour 
The application of PLS through PSIA in IBs is adequate in rendering the operations of two models, IBs 
and CBs, distinguishable. However, despite these structural differences, CBs and IBs need to fulfil 
minimum regulatory capital requirements. Under the PLS scheme, IAH do not have the same rights as 
depositors or shareholders, but they are required to absorb any losses on assets, except the cases of 
negligence or misconduct by the bank. By implication (Archer and Karim, 2009), PSIA are not insured 
accounts, or capital certain. Rather, they are treated as investment products. Thus, if the IBs pay a lower 
return to PSIA holders than the rate paid by CBs or pass some losses to these depositors, they may 
withdraw their deposits from the IBs. Thus there may be a greater risk of deposit withdrawal for IBs 
than for CBs (Sundararajan and Errico, 2002). Specially, for small IBs this risk is higher and thus more 
problematic. To manage this risk IBs forgo part of their profit share to pay competitive returns to 
mudarabah account holders (MAH). If IBs incur some loss, all that loss may be taken to the income 
accounts of IBs, which otherwise has to be shared with PSIA holders. This activity exposes the equity 
holders of IBs to displaced commercial risk; defined by the Islamic Financial Services Board, IFSB 
                                                          
5 By contrast, (Altunbas et al., 2007) have differentiated their analysis for commercial, co-operative and saving banks only to 
find co-operative banks to be somewhat different with respect to their key research questions. However, we believe that 




(2011), as additional risk borne by shareholders of IBs due to volatility of returns over and above the 
normal risks when PSIA holders were to share the loss in accordance with mudarabah contract. In other 
words, shareholders of an IB are exposed to additional losses which pertain to the PSIA depositors. The 
fact that PSIA holders are considered as investors and do not enjoy the same guarantees as other 
depositors (current accounts and savings accounts holders), or as shareholders, raises a major problem 
of governance that could impact negatively on IBs efficiency, through bank managers’ capital and risk 
decisions. In the reminder of this section we provide an overview of the main elements which may 
affect the risk-capital-performance relationship in IBs and CBs. 
An important feature that may affect the way capital structure influences efficient risk undertaking is 
that IB financiers are subject to a double agency problem; they have imperfect information on bank 
returns on investments (Pellegrina, 2012). As agent, the bank is not liable for losses but shares the 
profits with the investment account holder. An incentive to maximize investments funded by the 
account holder and to attract more account holders than it has the capacity to handle, can lead to 
investment decisions that are riskier than the investment account holder is willing to accept. Such 
“incentive misalignment”, in the context of asymmetric information and moral hazard, may lead to 
higher displaced commercial risk, which necessitates higher capital requirements (Van Greuning and 
Iqbal, 2008; Visser, 2009). 
In light of what is discussed above, monitoring is likely to be a main impetus behind the possible 
behavioural differences between IBs and CBs in terms of specific effect of capitalization on risk. In 
fact, since depositors in IBs share in risk, they could be pushed towards exerting tighter oversight over 
bank management compared to what occurs in traditional banks (Čihák and Hesse 2010). This should 
in principle result in an overall intensified monitoring activity, also sustained by higher interest 
alignment between stockholders and depositors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This may eventually limit 
managers’ risk taking exposure. On the other hand, the shareholders’ oversight on managerial actions 
could be mitigated by the fact that the former have a greater incentive to delegate it to other concerned 
agents (i.e., depositors) (Pellegrina, 2012). 
Another element driving potential differences between IBs and CBs is the capability of rewarding fixed-
return investors. The use of debt is relevant to agency cost in several ways (Pellegrina, 2012). First, 
promised interest payments to debt holders decrease free cash flow available for investment (Harvey et 
al., 2004; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). This decrease in free cash flow also helps in curtailing 
overinvestment problem (Harvey et al., 2004; D’Melloand Miranda, 2010). Second, higher leverage 
may reduce agency costs through the monitoring activities by debt holders (Ang et al., 2000). Third, 
greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of 
liquidation, which may cause managers to lose reputation salaries, perquisites, etc. (Grossman and Hart, 
1982; Williams, 1987). 
The role played by efficiency on the capital-risk channel in IBs can be explained in the light of regulators 
enforcement upon banks to increase the amount of capital with the amount of risk taken; Gropp and 
Heider (2010) and Altunbas et al., (2007) referred to this  positive relationship between capital and risk 
as the ‘regulatory hypothesis’. Holding additional capital buffers above the regulatory minimum for 
banks with higher levels of risk could be (a) aimed to avoid the costs associated with having to issue 
fresh equity at short notice (Ayuso et al., 2004; Peura and Keppo, 2006) (b) due to efficient market 
monitoring from markets when capital positions are deemed inadequate (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; 
Berger, 1995). Another reason for well-capitalized banks to take on more risk is that they are more 
remote from insolvency and can make use of riskier assets which yield a higher expected return.  
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In the framework of the regulatory hypothesis, capital and risk are also likely to be influenced by the 
level of efficiency of the banking firm. From a regulatory perspective, and other things being equal, 
regulators may allow an efficient firm with better management probably more room for leverage. On 
the other hand, from a moral hazard point  of view, a less efficient firm may be tempted to take on 
higher risk to compensate for the lost returns. Efficiency could, in turn, be also affected by the level of 
bank risk (Berger and De Young, 1997). For instance, managers who are inefficient at assessing and 
monitoring loans are not likely to be underperforming? Finally, a bank may choose to maximize short-
term profits by reducing the funds devoted to allocating and monitoring loans. This, other things being 
equal, would boost both efficiency and risk measures, producing (in the short-term) a positive 
relationship between risk and efficiency. Prior literature examining the determinants of banking risk 
takes into account the fact that capital and risk are both determined contemporaneously (Shrieves and 
Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Rime, 2001). Also capital and risk may also be simultaneously 
determined by the level of efficiency of the banking firm (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Hughes and 
Moon, 1997; Hughes and Mester, 1998). The implication of this hypothesis remains debatable in the 
case of IBs. Given the quasi-equity of IBs in the form of mudarabah saving and investment (S&I) 
deposits, an IB’s asset portfolio is heavily biased towards short-term/low-risk financing. Thus, capital 
adequacy in IBs provides them with an extra line of protection and risks are lower but it can negatively 
affect the efficiency of these banks. Thus, if the capital structure of CBs is based on leverage instead of 
equity, then free cash flow will be lower, subsequent to which risk will decrease as well. However, 
compared to CBs, less capitalized IBs are less inclined to reduce free cash flow since they are allowed 
to shift part of the risk on depositors (Hesse at al., 2008; Iqbal and Llewellyn, 2002; Sundararajan and 
Errico, 2002). For this reason, lower capitalization in IBs may not decrease risk taking to the same 
extent as for CBs. Our objective is to add to the empirical literature by providing new insights into the 
relationship between capital, risk, and efficiency. 
2.2 Related literature 
Recent economic crises have revealed the importance of bank regulations to hedge against the high risk 
attributed to imbalances in banks’ balance sheets. Capital regulation is one of the important tools that 
are used to prevent banks from failure (Carbó-Valverde and Sánchez, 2013; Levine and Zervos, 1998; 
Stiglitz, 2000). The examinations of the effect of bank capital regulations on bank behaviour have been 
focused on the US. These early studies were mainly concerned with whether the existence of flat-rate 
deposit insurance induced banks to take on excessive risk. They emphasize the importance of 
controlling other factors to limit risk-taking, such as the deposit insurance flat fee rate or the level of 
nominal interest rate (Marcus, 1983).  
The new wave of studies focusing on the relationship between risk and capital started after the 
introduction of the 1988 Basel Accord on international bank capital. The Basel Accord6 is, perhaps, the 
single most important regulatory framework that banks need to abide by, which attempts to control bank 
risk through capital adequacy requirements.7 Both the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact 
of capital regulation has produced a variety of conclusions concerning the efficiency and the risk-
adjustment behaviour of banks. On the one hand, regulations serve as prudential measures that mitigate 
the effects of economic crises on the stability of the banking system. On the other hand, excessive 
regulations may increase the cost of intermediation and reduce the profitability of the banking industry. 
                                                          
6 We collectively refer to all Basel accords here. For a history on the Basel Accords we direct you to https://www.bis.org/bcbs/ 
history.htm  
7 Capitalisation requirements have been consistently featured in Basel Accords. Basel II further introduced provisions for 
market risk (e.g., Value at Risk estimates), while Basel III regulates liquidity risk too. 
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Financing decisions made by many banks have been influenced by the regulatory minimum capital 
constraints (Wall and Peterson, 1988; Shrieves and Dahl, 1990). Empirical studies of the effectiveness 
of capital adequacy regulations and the relationship between increases in banking capital and risk tend 
to find that capital regulation in banking has been effective in increasing capital ratios without 
substantially shifting their portfolio and off-balance sheet exposure towards riskier assets (see e.g., 
Shrieves and Dahl, 1992, Editz et al., 1997; Rime, 2001). 
A number of studies have examined the triple relationship between risk, capital and efficiency in a 
unified framework (Altunbas et al., 2007; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Deelchand and Padgett, 2009; 
Dong et al., 2017; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Hu and Yu, 2015; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Tan and Floros, 
2013; Williams, 2004). Although there appears to be consensus on the choice of the capitalisation proxy 
with the equity to assets ratio, this is not the case for the risk proxy or the efficiency estimate. Several 
studies have used the non-performing loans to total loans (NPL/TL), see for example (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997; Dong et al., 2017; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). Non-performing 
loans to total loans is less susceptible to managerial discretion compared to loan loss provisions and/or 
reserves (LLP/TL, LLR/TL), see for example the studies of (Altunbas et al., 2007; Deelchand and 
Padgett, 2009; Tan and Floros, 2013; Williams, 2004) which opt for these proxies mainly driven by 
data availability issues. A few studies have also used other measures such as the z-score (Tan and Floros, 
2013), expected default (Fiordelisi et al., 2011) and risk-weighted assets to total assets (Hu and Yu, 
2015). The country focus is mainly developed economies, such as the US (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; 
Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997), the EU (Altunbas et al., 2007; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Williams, 2004) and 
Japan (Deelchand and Padgett, 2009). Developing countries have also been the focal point of (Tan and 
Floros, 2013), (Dong et al., 2017) for China and (Hu and Yu, 2015) for Taiwan.  
For the system of equations, two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) has 
been adopted in (Deelchand and Padgett, 2009; Hu and Yu, 2015; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Tan and 
Floros, 2013). Alternative techniques include GMM (Dong et al., 2017; Fiordelisi et al., 2011), SUR 
estimation (Altunbas et al., 2007) and Vector-autoregressive / Granger causality approach (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004).  
We review some of the results with the broadest of strokes. A certain support is found for the “bad 
management” hypothesis, whereby lower efficiency leads to higher risk (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Williams, 2004). Support for the “skimping hypothesis”, whereby higher 
efficiency is associated with higher risk is found in (Altunbas et al., 2007) and (Tan and Floros, 2013). 
The moral hazard hypothesis is verified in the studies of (Deelchand and Padgett, 2009) and (Tan and 
Floros, 2013). Under the moral hazard hypothesis capital and risk are inversely related; however, 
efficiency has a catalytic role. Specifically, the moral hazard hypothesis holds for the efficient banks 
(Deelchand and Padgett, 2009), while for the inefficient ones a positive link between capital and risk is 
verified, which attests to the “regulatory hypothesis”. 
The existing literature on IB, specifically on the linkage between risk, capital and efficiency is sparse. 
Academics have however focused instead on analysing the factors influencing bank risk-taking and 
efficiency and analysing the differences in stability between CBs and IBs. Some of these academics 
briefly touch upon the aspect of bank capital and its effect on the performance of IBs. 
The empirical work done which provides cross country evidence on the financial stability of CBs and 
IBs is fairly comparable. Čihák and Hesse (2010) compare the stability of Islamic versus conventional 
banks, using data from 20 member countries of the OIC between 1993 and 2004. They find that small 
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IBs are more stable than similar-sized CBs. Large IBs, however, are less stable. Abedifar et al. (2013) 
find no significant difference between the two banking sectors with respect to the insolvency risk. Their 
finding on credit risk is mixed, varying according to which proxy for credit risk is used. For instance, 
IBs have lower credit risk than CBs, specifically in the case of highly leveraged banks operating in 
predominantly Muslim countries. Also, small IBs exhibit greater stability as they are more capitalized. 
However, they found no significant difference between large IBs and CBs. 
Only a few recent studies (Alam, 2012; Bitar, 2016; Bitar 2018) have tried to assess the impact of Basel 
III requirements on the efficiency and risk for IBs. Alam (2012) examines the conflicted relationship 
between banking regulations, risk, and efficiency between CBs and IBs. Using data on capital, liquidity, 
risk and efficiency, he argues that IBs are more adaptable to regulatory requirements than CBs. However 
a similar relationship is observed for both IBs and CBs in that a negative relationship between capital 
buffers and risk is observed for both bank categories and a positive relationship with bank efficiency 
confirming the results of Pasiouras (2008), Chortareasa et al. (2012), and Barth et al. (2013). Bitar et 
al. (2016) examine the impact of the Basel III regulatory framework on the efficiency of IBs and CBs 
using conditional quantile regressions. They find that IBs are significantly more efficient than 
conventional banks and Basel III requirements for higher capital and liquidity are negatively associated 
with the efficiency of IBs while the opposite is true for financial leverage. Their results show that the 
impact of capital requirements on bank performance is more pronounced for too-bi-to-fail banks. 
Furthermore, they find that higher capital and liquidity positions resulted in better efficiency for CBs 
than IBs during the subprime crisis. Bitar et al. (2018) examine whether the imposition of higher capital 
ratios is effective in reducing risk and improving the efficiency and profitability of banking institution. 
They use various proxies for capital ratios to determine which kinds of capital are most effective in 
enhancing banking system stability and performance. Their findings shed an important light on the 
application of Basel III in that the weighting methodologies used for calculating risk-based capital ratio 
can have negative implication specifically for highly liquid banks as imposing higher capital ratios may 
have a negative effect on the efficiency and profitability of highly liquid banks. 
We go a step further in analysing capital, risk and efficiency simultaneously so as to explain the 
behavioural difference between CBs and IBs with regard banks attaining efficiency in light of its effect 
on capital ratio and risks. In this study, we adopt an approach taken by Deelchand and Padget (2009) 
and Heid et al. (2003). These researchers treat efficiency, risk, and capital simultaneously. 
3. Methodology 
This section discusses the modelling framework adopted in this paper. We follow the studies of 
(Altunbas et al., 2007; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Deelchand and Padgett, 2009; Dong et al., 2017; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Hu and Yu, 2015; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Tan and Floros, 2013; Williams, 
2004) in specifying a system of three equations; one for each variable of interest, namely risk, capital 
and efficiency. The system of equations is estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
approach of (Zellner, 1962), in line with (Altunbas et al., 2007). The main advantages of the SUR 
estimation technique are that i) it allows for simultaneity between the dependent variables, ii) it is an 
efficient estimation technique that uses contemporaneous correlation information among error terms of 
the equations (Moon and Perron, 2005). The system of the three equations is given below: 
 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾0𝛪𝛣 + 𝛾1𝛪𝛣 × 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝛪𝛣 × 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛾3𝛪𝛣 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾4𝛪𝛣 × 𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾5𝛪𝛣 × 𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾6𝛪𝛣 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑗𝑡





 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾0𝛪𝛣 + 𝛾1𝛪𝛣 × 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝛪𝛣 × 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛾3𝛪𝛣 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾4𝛪𝛣 × 𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾5𝛪𝛣 × 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾6𝛪𝛣 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛾7𝛪𝛣 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾8𝛪𝛣 × 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(2)  
 
 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5  𝑂𝐵𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾0𝛪𝛣 + 𝛾1𝛪𝛣 × 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝛪𝛣 × 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛾3𝛪𝛣 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾4𝛪𝛣 × 𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾5𝛪𝛣 × 𝑂𝐵𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾6𝛪𝛣 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛾7𝛪𝛣 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾8𝛪𝛣 × 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(3)  
 
where the subscripts 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑡 index banks, countries and years respectively and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the 
stochastic error term. 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 is denotes the insolvency risk (proxied by the z-score). 𝐶𝐴𝑃 denotes the 
capitalisation and is proxied by the Equity/Assets ratio. 𝐸𝐹𝐹 denotes the cost efficiency. IB denotes the 
Islamic banking dummy which takes the value of 1 for an Islamic bank, zero otherwise. The following 
bank-level control variables are included: Bank size, as the natural logarithm of total assets; 
profitability, proxied by ROA; the tax to pre-tax profit ratio (TPBT); liquidity proxied by net loans to 
total assets (NLTA); Off-balance sheet items/Total Assets. As macroeconomic and market structure 
controls we include the concentration ratio of the three largest banks in terms of assets in a given country 
and time (CR3), the annual real GDP growth rate (GDPGR) and the annual inflation rate (INFLATION).   
3.1 Efficiency estimation 
Our choice of cost efficiency is motivated by the prior literature. First, cost efficiency is the preferred 
efficiency measure in most studies that investigate the triple relationship between capital, risk and 
efficiency (Altunbas et al., 2007; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Deelchand and Padgett, 2009; Dong et 
al., 2017; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Hu and Yu, 2015; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Williams, 2004). Second, 
there is more consensus on the comparative studies between Islamic and conventional banks on cost 
efficiency as opposed to technical efficiency. 
In this study, we estimate cost efficiency using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), and apply a translog 
functional form as it is flexible, easy to estimate and permits the imposition of homogeneity (Coelli and 
Perelman, 2000). We opt for an SFA estimation over a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) alternative 
as it allows for stochastic errors and takes into account the panel nature of our data. Besides, SFA seems 
to be the preferred estimation technique for efficiency in the literature that investigate the triple 
relationship between capital, risk and efficiency.8 We follow the intermediation approach to modelling 
financial institution behaviour as proposed by (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) and assumes that banks act 
as intermediaries between savers and borrowers. The approach has been adopted in (Berger and Mester, 
1997; Karas et al., 2010; Mamatzakis, 2015; Weill, 2003) in estimating conventional banking 
efficiency, and in (Abdul-Majid et al., 2010; Johnes et al., 2014; Sufian and Noor, 2009) in IB/CB 
comparative efficiency estimation settings. For the choice of inputs and outputs we are guided by the 
                                                          
8 The intermediation approach assumes that banks act as intermediaries between savers and borrowers and posits total loans 
and securities as output, whereas deposits along with labour and physical capital are defined as inputs. This approach reflects 
the way IBs operate as they rely on profit-sharing contracts, which involve equity participation principle with depositors. IBs 
can therefore be seen as intermediating savers and investors by transforming deposits into earning assets, rather than as 
producers of services and loans 
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existing literature and opt for a setting with two outputs; namely net total loans (𝑦1) and other earning 
assets (𝑦2). For Islamic banks who do not issue loans per se, the convention is that PLS instruments are 
used instead, see for example (Johnes et al., 2014). The banks make use of three inputs; physical 
capital (𝑥1), labour (𝑥2) and financial capital (𝑥3). The price of physical capital (𝑤1) is given by the 
ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets. The price of labour (𝑤2) is given as the ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets. The price of financial capital (𝑤3) is computed by dividing interest expenses 
by total funding. Total cost is calculated as interest and non-interest costs divided by total assets. In our 
SFA approach we incorporate country specific variables directly into the cost efficiency model, which 
has been cited critical for cross-country studies by incorporating the environmental economic effect in 
the estimated frontier (Carvallo and Kasman, 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005). To empirically implement 
the cost frontier, the translog form of the cost function to be estimated is specified as follows: 
 
ln 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  α0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚 ln 𝑤𝑚,𝑖𝑗𝑡
2
𝑚=1





















𝑌𝑠,𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(1)  
 
where subscripts 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡 denote banks, countries and time respectively, 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the natural log of 
total costs, 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑚,𝑖𝑗𝑡 the natural log of input prices, 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑠,𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the natural log of outputs, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑙, and 𝜑, 
are the parameters to be estimated, 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the stochastic error term and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the inefficiency term. 
Standard linear homogeneity and symmetry restrictions in all quadratic terms are imposed in accordance 
with economic theory, while we also include country, year and ownership dummies to capture any 
differences across countries. The linear homogeneity conditions are imposed by normalizing Total Cost 
(𝐶), price of financial capital (𝑤3) and price of labour (𝑤2), by the price of price of physical capital 
(𝑤1). The translog SFA function further includes time and country dummies to control for country 
heterogeneity and shifts in the frontier. 
 
In this model we allow for the cost inefficiency term 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 to have a systematic component 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 associated 
with exogenous macroeconomic and market structure variables, and a random component 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡, in line 
with (Saeed and Izzeldin, 2016). The macroeconomic variables used in this step are: i) GDP per capita, 
ii) real GDP growth, iii) degree of monetization, iv) stock market capitalisation, v) annual inflation rate, 
and vi) population density. For market structure variables we opt for the concentration ratio of the three 
largest banks in each country/year. Specifically, 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  is given as: 
 
 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≡ 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛾 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2)  
where 𝛾 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
4. Data 
This section describes, the data coverage and sources used for this study, the dependent variables of the 
system of equations, the explanatory variables used and presents key descriptive statistics.  
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4.1 Data coverage and sources 
The data are drawn predominantly from the balance sheets and income statements of the Bureau van 
Dijk Bankscope database for the period 2000 to 2012 and across 14 countries. The countries are: 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, Turkey and the UAE. A small number of observations for missing periods were obtained from 
the annual reports of individual banks. Our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 2,757 bank-
year observations for 245 banks. Of these, 65 are Islamic and 180 are conventional banks, which means 
that nearly 26% of our sample coverage relates to Islamic banks - similar or higher than previous studies 
(Abdul-Majid et al., 2010; Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 2006; Beck et al., 2013; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; 
Srairi, 2010). Table 1 presents the distribution of bank observations by operational mode and country.  
[Table 1 around here] 
Islamic windows are excluded from this subsample due to supervisory issues and capital adequacy 
requirements raised rendering them substantially different from those raised for full-fledged Islamic 
financial institutions (IFSB, 2011). Furthermore, we include banks for which at least five years of data 
are available over the sampled period. The minimum requirement of five years helps to distinguish 
reliably between random noise and bank inefficiency in the errors of estimated cost functions to 
calculate cost and profit efficiency (Fries and Taci, 2005). After these restrictions, the sample countries 
host about 77% of the worldwide Islamic banking assets. 
Macroeconomic variables include the gross domestic product (GDP), degree of monetization 
(MONET), GDP per capita (GDPPC), real GDP growth (GDPG), stock market capitalisation 
(MKTGDP), annual inflation rate (INFLATION) and density of population (DPOP). All monetary 
values are convereted to real 2010 prices using each country’s consumer price index (CPI). Data source 
for macroeconomic data are IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the World Bank. Market 
structure variables, such as market concentration (CR3), are calculated using Bankscope data. 
4.2 Dependent variables 
We proxy insolvency risk (IR) using the z-score, which is a widely used proxy for this purpose 
(Abedifar et al., 2013; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Lepetit et al., 2008). In principle 
the Z-score calculates the number of standard deviations that the bank’s return on assets (ROA) must 
fall below its mean in order to deplete equity. The Z-score increases with higher profitability and 
capitalization levels and decreases with volatile earnings. Therefore, high values of the Z-score denote 
financially stable banks bearing a low probability of default. In practice, there are several definitions 
with  (Mare et al., 2017) providing a nice review. In our study we use the (Cihák and Hesse, 2007) 
variant, which is given by: 
  
 








where 𝑡 =  1, … , 𝑇, ROA is the Return on Assets and 𝜎(∙) denotes the standard deviation operator.  
The (Cihák and Hesse, 2007) measure of the Z-score considers only the last period value for the 
Equity/Assets and the ROA, while it computes 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝛵) over the whole sample period. In this way it 
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is better suited for an unbalanced panel. The z-score can be equally applied to Islamic and conventional 
banks since these operate in the same environment and face the same risks in case they run out of capital. 
Another popular measure of insolvency risk is the Distance-To-Default, which uses stock price data to 
measure the volatility in the economic capital of the bank, see (Saeed and Izzeldin, 2016). However, as 
most Islamic banks are not listed in a stock exchange, market price data are not available.  
Capitalisation is proxied by the ratio of equity to assets and measures the bank’s financial cushion to 
absorb financial losses. Efficiency is the dependent variable of Equation (3) and refers to cost efficiency 
which is estimated using a stochastic frontier approach, as described in an earlier section.  
 
4.3 Explanatory variables 
Bank-specific variables include total assets (SIZE), as a key determinant of capitalisation, risk and 
efficiency. For example, large banks can be more efficient (Abdul-Majid et al., 2005; Miller and Noulas, 
1996) because of the economies of scale and scope they can utilise. Large banks may also be less 
capitalised for reasons related to their ready access to interbank and/or capital markets, higher risk 
taking and/or higher efficiency (Hughes and Mester, 1998; Peltzman, 1970). Banks are also subject to 
direct taxation (e.g., corporate tax), which is proxied by the tax to pre-tax ratio (TPBT). Although the 
tax rate on corporate profit is not a choice for banks, yet, the bank management should be able to 
structure its portfolio to minimize tax. Since consumers face an inelastic demand for banking services, 
it is expected that most banks are able to pass the tax burden to their customers. A positive relationship 
between taxation and profitability is verified in (Bashir, 2003; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999) for 
banks in Middle East and (Jiang et al., 2012) for banks in Hong Kong. As profitability is directly related 
to financial risk, capitalisation and efficiency, as explained in an earlier section, we control for 
differences with respect to tax environment. 
The next set of explanatory variables enter specific equations. For the risk equation (Eq1), a measure 
of liquidity is included as rapid loan growth may increase risk which may impact adversely on capital 
and bank efficiency. Our choice of liquidity proxy is the net loans to total assets (NLTA). Liquidity 
management is crucial to accommodate sudden decreases in liabilities and support expansion of the 
assets side of the balance sheet. Bank managers need to counterweigh the inverse relationship between 
liquidity and profitability, whereby extra liquidity comes at the cost of forgone investment 
opportunities, and the positive relationship between liquidity and financial stability, which is further 
emphasised in Basel III (Bordeleau and Graham, 2010; Bourke, 1989). With regards to liquidity 
management, Islamic banks have the additional challenge of limited access to interbank markets, which 
justifies in part their higher liquidity (Beck et al., 2013; Pappas et al., 2017). In the capitalisation 
equation (Eq2), we control for profitability using the return on assets (ROA). Profitability and 
capitalisation are strongly related as verified in earlier studies (Berger, 1995; Scholtens, 2000). The 
efficiency equation (Eq3) includes the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets (OBSTA) to control 
for off-balance sheet (OBS) activities that the bank may be using without adjusting their capital structure 
(e.g., loan commitments, standby letters of credit and commercial papers). The moral hazard hypothesis 
states that OBSTA activities increase bank risk; thus, leading to inefficiency. 
Macroeconomic and market structure variables are also factored in the system of equations. 
Concentration (MCONC) can have positive or negative impact on bank performance. A strand of the 
literature suggests a positive relationship between concentration and banking performance (Bourke, 
1989; Smirlock, 1985; Staikouras and Wood, 2004). This is plausibly linked to the ‘quiet life’ 
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hypothesis and the greater the monopolistic power such banks would exhibit. On the other hand, certain 
studies report an inverse relationship between concentration and performance. For example, Ben Naceur 
and Goaied (2008) for Tunisia, and Karasulu, (2001) for Korea. Iannotta et al., (2007) suggests that 
concentration affects both banking risk and performance for a sample of European banks. Fiordelisi et 
al., (2011) also document an inverse relationship between risk and concentration that implies of bank 
risks being lower in concentrated markets, which is in line with the notion that competitive banking 
systems may be less stable of (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005). 
The annual GDP growth rate (GDPGR) captures the cyclical conditions of the macroeconomic 
environment. It is also expected to capture the implications for bank efficiency as demand for financial 
products depends on the level of economic activity. Several empirical studies (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Schure and Wagenvoort, 1999; Semih Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007) find that 
countries with higher GDP growth rate feature more efficient and stable banking institutions. 
Inflation (INF) is an important determinant of banking performance. The findings of the relationship 
between inflation and bank performance are mixed. In general, high inflation rates are associated with 
high loan interest rates and high income.  Empirical studies of Guru et al. (2002) for Malaysia and Jiang 
et al., (2012) for Hong Kong show that high inflation rates lead to higher bank profitability. However, 
the effect of inflation on banking performance depends on whether inflation is anticipated or not (Perry, 
1992). If inflation is fully anticipated and interest rates are adjusted accordingly, there is likely to be a 
positive impact on profitability. Alternatively, unexpected inflation causes cash flow difficulties for 
borrowers, which can lead to premature termination of loan arrangements and precipitate loan losses. 
Indeed, if the banks are sluggish in adjusting their interest rates, there is a possibility that banks’ costs 
may increase faster than bank revenue. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) notice that banks in 
developing countries tend to be less profitable in inflationary environments, particularly when they have 
high capital ratios. In addition, Hoggarth et al., (2001) also conclude that high and variable inflation 
may cause difficulties in planning and negotiating loans. The definitions of the variables are given in 
table 2 
[Table 2 around here] 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the efficiency estimation and the variables 
used in the main analysis, for the sample of all banks, Islamic banks and conventional banks. Islamic 
banks have lower z-score, on average, compared to conventional banks (16.86 versus 19.29), suggesting 
that they exhibit higher insolvency risk. Capitalisation of Islamic banks is higher than their conventional 
counterparts (19.84% versus 11.02%), a finding which is consistent with the literature (Beck et al., 
2013). In terms of cost efficiency, the two bank types show no significant differences. Islamic banks 
are smaller than conventional banks as indicated by the average size (92,447 versus 111,466); however 
the two bank types have similar profitability, as indicated by the ROA, and liquidity, as shown by the 
NLTA. However, conventional banks have significantly higher off-balance sheet activities (51.60% 
versus 24.82%) than Islamic banks, which may partially explain the lower risk profile of the latter.    






Table 4 presents estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis from the SUR 
estimation of the system of equations in section 4. The estimates of the risk equation that uses the z-
score are shown as equation 1. Equation 2 presents the results for the equation related to capitalisation, 
whereas for cost efficiency equations the results are presented as equation 3. Each equation comprises 
three models (labelled I, II and III) that allow for increasingly more variation between the two banking 
models. In particular, model I allows for a level shift in the dependent variables between Islamic and 
conventional banks, by including an Islamic bank binary variable. Variant II allows for unique 
sensitivities of the two banking models with respect to the triple-relationship variables (risk, 
capitalisation and efficiency), with variant III allowing for unique sensitivity to all bank-related and 
macroeconomic/market structure variables. In all cases this is achieved by appropriate interaction terms 
between the Islamic bank binary variable and the variables of interest. We are mindful of endogeneity 
in our analysis. We test the exogeneity of the regressors for each individual equation via the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test. Subsequently we perform the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test of independence of 
correlations across equations. The conclusion of both tests suggests that endogeneity is not an issue, 
and that the SUR estimation technique is appropriate in this context.9 
[Table 4 around here] 
5.1 Risk / Capitalisation 
 
For both bank types, our results suggest an inverse and bi-directional relationship between insolvency 
risk and capitalisation. In particular through Model I in Equations 1 and 2 we have ?̂?𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 18.808 
and ?̂?𝑧−𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 0.647 respectively. This gives prima facie evidence that higher capitalisation reduces 
risk exposure and offers an affirmation of the regulatory hypothesis, whereby capital should increase 
commensurably with the risk exposure of the bank. This result is in line with Fiordelisi et al., (2011) 
who also verify a bi-directional relationship for credit risk and capitalisation. 
 
Allowing for a difference in the business model does not affect the inverse and bi-directional 
relationship between insolvency risk and capitalisation remains. However, the magnitude of the 
response for each bank type appears remarkably different. In particular through Model III in Equations 
1 and 2 we have ?̂?𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙|𝐶𝐵 = 49.214 and ?̂?𝑧−𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒|𝐶𝐵 = 0.574 for conventional banks respectively, 
and ?̂?𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙|𝐼𝐵 = 9.75 and ?̂?𝑧−𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒|𝐼𝐵 = 0.756 for Islamic banks respectively.
10 This suggests that 
despite the fact that capitalisation response to increases in insolvency risk is significantly more 
pronounced in the case of Islamic banks, the ‘regulatory effect’ is less effective. Even though Islamic 
banks increase their capitalisation by 27.5% more than conventional banks for each unit of risk they 
assume, any capitalisation increase on behalf of Islamic banks has an approximately five-times smaller 
effect on risk taking compared to conventional banks. 
 
Overall, it appears that Islamic banks are more in line with the regulator's requirements about increasing 
capital commensurably with the risk exposure. However, the results also suggest that for controlling 
risk taking in Islamic banks, regulators may have to rely on alternative measures as capitalisation is not 
as effective as in conventional banks. 
                                                          
9 Hence using instrumental variables or 2SLS approach is not appropriate due to the lack of endogeneity in the system. 
10 The effect of capitalisation on the z-score for Islamic banks is given as ?̂?𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙|𝐼𝐵 = ?̂?𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + ?̂?𝐼𝐵×𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 49.21 −




The reason for this differentiated effect may be in part explained by the fact that Islamic banks have the 
necessary mechanisms that provide discipline and effective monitoring in place. Depositors and 
investment accountholders are incentivized to monitor performance, given the uncertainty in payouts 
that is achieved through the equity-type contractual agreements. The effectiveness of such mechanisms 
may be, in part, corroborated by the positive and significant coefficient on the Islamic bank binary 
variable in Equation 1, suggesting that this bank type is financially more stable. Besides, the use of 
investment accountholders resembles the use of subordinated debt as a way to monitor bank activities 
through increased withdrawal risk, which has received some support in the conventional banking system 
(Wall 1989). This is corroborated further in Altunbas et al., (2007) who suggest a potential positive 
implication of subordinated debt on the bank's alignment with the regulatory hypothesis. However, 
despite this more pronounced response of Islamic banks, the increase of capitalisation is not as effective 
in reducing banking risk as for the case of conventional banks.  
 
The effect from capitalisation to risk represents the unintended consequences of regulatory actions, 
where banks respond to the increased capitalisation requirements by assuming more risk, to compensate 
for the forgone benefits of the leverage (Kahane, 1977). The fact that this effect is significantly less 
pronounced (about five-times) for Islamic banks might be plausibly attributed to their significantly 
higher capitalisation, see (Beck et al., 2013; Pappas et al., 2017) and Section 4.4 of this paper) than 
conventional banks. Often banks operate in excess of the regulatory capitalisation requirements to avoid 
costs associated with a swift re-capitalisation (Peura and Keppo, 2006). Therefore, the furthest away 
the bank's capitalisation from the minimum regulatory limit, the smaller the unintended consequences 
of regulatory actions are expected to be, and capitalisation’s effectiveness in controlling risk might be 
reduced. 
 
5.2 Efficiency / Risk 
For both bank types, our results suggest an inverse and bi-directional relationship between insolvency 
risk and cost efficiency. In particular through Model I in Equations 1 and 3 we have ?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓 = 1.722 and 
?̂?𝑧−𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 0.335 respectively. These results offer support for the ‘bad (good) management’ and ‘bad 
(good) luck’ hypotheses respectively. Specifically, lower (higher) cost efficiency is associated with 
higher (lower) risk taking. Likewise, higher (lower) risk taking reduces (increase) cost efficiency. This 
result is in line with (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Williams, 2004) who also find 
evidence in support of these hypotheses for their respective samples of US/EU banks. 
 
Allowing for a difference in the business model does not affect the inverse relationship from risk to cost 
efficiency. However, the response of risk to efficiency is now a positive one. In particular through 
Model III in Equations 1 and 3 we have ?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓|𝐶𝐵 = 5.214 and ?̂?𝑧−𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒|𝐶𝐵 = 0.350 for conventional 
banks respectively, and ?̂?𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙|𝐼𝐵 = −9.787 and ?̂?𝑧−𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒|𝐼𝐵 = 0.178 for Islamic banks respectively. 
This suggests that for both bank types a reduction in risk is beneficial for cost efficiency, albeit the 
effect is about 67.6% less pronounced for the Islamic banks. Conversely, an increase in cost efficiency 
is regarded differently by the two bank types with regards to their risk levels. In particular, higher cost 
efficiency is related to lower risk for conventional banks but higher risk for Islamic banks.  
 
Our results for conventional banks verify previous findings on EU commercial banks whereby it is 
claimed that efficient banks should be granted with a softer regulatory touch due to their superior 
management abilities (Altunbas et al., 2007). However, this claim receives little support for the case of 
Islamic banks, where support of the ‘skimping hypothesis’ exists. Hence, the most efficient Islamic 
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banks are expected to bear higher risk. The mixed results in the case of Islamic banks may relate to their 
being a more heterogeneous sample and/or non-linearities in the cost efficiency/risk relationship. 
Specifically, it may be plausible that the risk profile of Islamic banks changes markedly across the cost 
efficiency spectrum and/or there are differences in the implementation of Islamic banking across the 
countries, as suggested in (Johnes et al., 2017). 
 
5.3 Capitalisation / Efficiency 
For both bank types, our results suggest an inverse and bi-directional, inverse relationship between 
capitalisation and cost efficiency. In particular through Model I in Equations 2 and 3 we have ?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓 =
−2.232 and ?̂?𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = −16.386 respectively. The results suggest that higher cost efficiency is 
associated with lower capitalisation and vice versa. There seems to be a substitution effect between the 
two metrics. 
 
Allowing for differences in the business models does not affect the inverse relationship from 
capitalisation to cost efficiency. However, the response of capitalisation to cost efficiency is now a 
positive one. In particular through Model III in Equations 2 and 3 we have ?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓|𝐶𝐵 = −6.498 and 
?̂?𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙|𝐶𝐵 = −39.748 for conventional banks respectively, and ?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓|𝐼𝐵 = 8.209 and ?̂?𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙|𝐼𝐵 =
−5.859 for Islamic banks respectively. These results further corroborate the substitution effect between 
capitalisation and cost efficiency for conventional banks. However, the results for Islamic banks suggest 
that higher cost efficiency is associated with increased capitalisation; a complementary relationship.  
 
It has been argued that efficient banks should be given more flexibility from the regulator with regards 
to their leverage levels due to their superior management (Altunbas et al., 2007; Hughes et al., 2001). 
The conventional banks in our case seem to verify this “regulatory efficiency aware hypothesis” as 
more efficient banks have lower capitalisation. Thus, capitalisation and cost efficiency may be 
substitutes in controlling bank risk taking. Consequently, efficient banks may have higher flexibility to 
increase their leverage, possibly putting forward their superior management (reflected upon efficiency) 
that could justify their ability to assume higher risks. By contrast, Islamic banks do not conform to this 
hypothesis as more efficient banks have higher capitalisation too. 
This key difference between the two banking models lies, in part, to their capitalisation profiles, where 
the Islamic banks’ preclusion from debt instruments limits their ability to leverage to similar extends as 
conventional banks. Higher levels of cost efficiency are pursued by both banks. However, each bank 
reaps the benefits in a different way. For conventional banks, higher efficiency is desirable as it 
manifests in flexibility to increase leverage, assume higher risks and reap the associated gains. For 
Islamic banks, increases in risk are supported by higher efficiency and higher capitalisation. This result 
highlights that efficiency is not panacea; as such it should be interesting for regulators who may want 
to tailor capitalisation requirements in line with bank efficiency level and bank type. Efficiency should 
not be used as the sole determinant for capital requirements particularly in countries where different 
bank types co-exist, such as Islamic and conventional.  
5.4 Impact of bank specific, macroeconomic and market structure variables 
Of the remaining bank-specific control variables, size positively affects insolvency risk of both bank 
types, while it is inversely related to the capitalisation of either bank. In both cases the effect is 
significantly more pronounced for the Islamic banks. In particular, the marginal effects of size on 
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insolvency risk are ?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|𝐶𝐵 = 0.925 and ?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|𝐼𝐵 = 7.572, while for capitalisation they are ?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|𝐶𝐵 =
−0.308 and ?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|𝐼𝐵 = −5.959 for conventional and Islamic banks respectively. In addition, size is 
inversely related to cost efficiency ?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|𝐶𝐵 = −0.481 but for conventional banks only. Overall, it 
appears that a larger bank size encourages riskier behaviour through two ways; a direct and an indirect 
one. First, a larger bank is more likely to (over-)rely on the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine; hence assume 
higher risk on the assumption that it would be bailed out (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Gorton 
and Huang, 2004; Tarashev et al., 2009). Indeed, several studies have found evidenced of increased risk 
with government participation for financial institutions (Berger et al., 2005; Cornett et al., 2010; 
Iannotta et al., 2007). This is clearly evidenced from the positive coefficient on ?̂?𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 for conventional 
and, in particular, Islamic banks. The pronounced effect for Islamic banks might be plausibly related to 
the prominence that these banks enjoy in some countries, and their ownership status and close 
connections with the government and/or royal families which corroborates with the view that decisions 
in government-owned banks may not be based on entirely economic criteria (Iannotta et al., 2007). 
Second, larger banks withhold less capital; the latter being inversely linked to bank risk taking as 
highlighted in an earlier section. This is particularly relevant for conventional banks who have 
unrestricted access to capital markets. 
Real GDP growth reduces risk taking in conventional banks ?̂?𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅|𝐶𝐵 = −1.329, while the opposite 
result is reached for Islamic banks ?̂?𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅|𝐼𝐵 = 7.772. The result for conventional banks is in line with 
our expectations and the literature that finds banks located in fast growing countries to have a relatively 
low portion of bad loans, hence lower risk (Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
However, Islamic banks have most of their investments in real assets, which are directly affected by the 
macroeconomic conditions. It might be plausible that during periods of economic boom, Islamic banks 
increase their risk taking to exploit the good economic conditions and reap the extra returns. Both bank 
types exhibit an inverse relationship between real GDP growth and capitalisation suggesting that in 
good economic climate capitalisation levels tend to reduce as banks channel more funds into 
investments while limit their protective cushions. The effect is particularly pronounced and significant 
for Islamic banks ?̂?𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅|𝐼𝐵 = −7.593, while for conventional banks it is not statistically significant. 
An inverse relationship between real GDP growth and cost efficiency for both bank types suggests that 
any improvements in managerial skills and effort might be postponed during good economic times; 
possibly as the attention is gravitated elsewhere. This finding appears to be typical of emerging markets 
during economic expansion phases (Maudos et al., 2002). 
A positive relationship between inflation and capitalisation is evidenced for both bank types; however, 
the magnitude is around eight times more pronounced in Islamic banks. This is plausible given that 
Islamic banks are sensitive to inflationary pressure due to the specifics of the profit-and-loss sharing 
contracts that are utilised, which cannot be inflation-linked or have varying maturities (Pappas et al., 
2017). This manifests into an important concern for the bank - which has to bear such risks entirely - 
particularly when taking into account the volatile and/or high inflation rates in these countries but also 
the lack of specialized hedging instruments to the Islamic banks’ disposal. A positive impact of inflation 
on insolvency risk is evidenced for conventional banks, whereas for Islamic banks the effect is negative. 
For Islamic banks it corroborates their inability to operate in unstable economic environments, as this 
is manifested through high inflationary rates. Conversely, for conventional banks this seems not to be 
a concern as they can hedge themselves against such risks either through capital markets or less 
restrictive products they offer (e.g., rates in line with inflation). 
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Concentration increases (decreases) risk for conventional (Islamic) banks. By contrast, higher 
concentration in the banking industry decreases (increases) the capitalisation of conventional (Islamic) 
banks. The impact of concentration on efficiency is positive for both bank types. It appears that a more 
concentrated market is beneficial for Islamic banks, which perhaps enjoy a “quiet life” by being the 
dominant player. This is not surprising due to the infancy stage of Islamic banks and the fact that most 
of their products are still largely unstandardized and comprise a highly manual process. 
5.5 Robustness Check 
Our sample contains Iran, whose banking system is entirely Islamic. To check whether or results are 
biased due to the inclusion of Iran as Iran dominates the sample of Islamic banks, we re-examined the 
SUR models by excluding Iran from our data. With the exception of the cost efficiency’s effect on both 
capital and Z-score in models II and Model III, the results derived from these estimations remain robust 
and consistent across the baseline estimations (See Table 5a).  
[Table 5a around here] 
To check whether our results are not driven by a potential simultaneity bias that could arise due to the 
potential endogeneity of the firm-specific variables, we make use of the Two Stage Least Squares 
analysis (G2SLS IV RE). For the three different models each using three equations to examine the 
relationship between the three parameters namely risk, capital and efficiency, different instrumental 
variables are used to examine the endogeneity bias. For the first model which examines the impact on 
risk, capitalization and efficiency are considered endogenous; for the second model which examines the 
impact on capitalization, risk and efficiency are considered endogenous and for the last model which 
examines the impact on cost efficiency, capitalization and risk are considered endogenous. With the 
exception of the behavior of a few variables in only two equations of Model I, the results derived from 
these estimations remain robust and consistent across alternative specification.11 The G2SLS IV-RE 
estimates show that for the overall sample large size leads to increased riskiness. However, for Islamic 
banks an increase in size results in less riskiness. Overall the robustness test suggests that the baseline 
results do not appear to be driven by endogeneity bias.12  
[Table 5b around here] 
We also introduce times fixed effect in our baseline model in table 5c. The difference between the 
baseline table 5a and 5c is minimal. 
[Table 5c around here] 
To assess the robustness of our results with respect to the risk measure applied, we have used a second 
measure of risk, LLP/TL, LLPTL is loan-loss reserves to total loans ratio, instead of Z-score. Table 
5d presents the results of the relationship between capital, efficiency and risk, where LLPTL is used as 
an alternative risk measure. Z-score is usually used as a proxy for insolvency risk and indicates the 
                                                          
11 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is performed which checks the exogeneity of capitalization risk and efficiency in the three 
models; the null hypothesis that the three variables are exogenous fails to be rejected at 5% significance level, favouring the 
results from the SUR model. To decide between fixed-effects and random-effects model the Hausman test is employed, where 
the null hypothesis that the bank effects are uncorrelated with the additional variables is not rejected, favouring the random-
effects estimator. Therefore, the model is estimated using a random-effects instrumental approach. The results of the G2SLS 





distance from insolvency and combines accounting measures of leverage, profitability and volatility 
whereas LLPTL is used as a proxy for credit risks as it reflects on the quality of the loan portfolio, thus 
slight differences are expected to be seen between the results of table 4,5c and table 5d. When LLPTL 
is used as a proxy  increase in capital and efficiency lead to an increase in risk showing that 
there is a trade-off between increasing capital and maintaining a high profit efficiency, however 
when z-score is use which is an indicator which takes into account leverage, profitability and 
volatility, the results are different and in line with that of Saeed et al. (2014) whereby there is 
no trade-off between efficiency and low risk. The effect of bank specific and macro level variables 
on risk, where LLPTL is used as a proxy for risk is observed to be the same regardless of the risk proxy 
used. Although just a few macro level variables have differing signs from our expected results as well 
as those observed when Z-score is used as a proxy for risk. 
[Table 5d around here] 
6. Conclusion 
Our paper investigates the triple-relationship between risk, capital and efficiency for Islamic and 
conventional banks. Our data span 14 countries over the 2000-2012 period and comprise 65 Islamic and 
180 conventional banks. We use the z-score as a proxy for insolvency risk, and cost efficiency estimated 
via a stochastic frontier approach. Our capitalisation proxy is the equity to assets. An array of bank-
specific, macroeconomic and market structure variables are used in a system of three equations, 
estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique. 
With regards to the three key variables our findings suggest that the capitalisation response to increases 
in insolvency risk is significantly more pronounced in the case of Islamic banks but has an 
approximately five-times smaller effect on risk taking compared to conventional banks. This markedly 
different result for Islamic banks is driven in part by their reliance on investment account holders who 
are better suited to monitor the bank’s activities compared to conventional depositors and the better 
capitalisation of Islamic banks. Thus, AAOFI and IFSB, the two regulatory bodies for Islamic banks, 
should take into consideration the need to revaluate the risk weighting of the required capital in 
accordance to Basel III regulations. In the long run, the likelihood of Islamic banks facing a trade-off 
between risk and capitalization can widen which can consequently affect the performance of IBs 
globally. 
 
For both bank types a reduction in risk is beneficial for cost efficiency, albeit this effect is less 
pronounced for the Islamic banks. Conversely, increases in cost efficiency are perceived differently by 
the two bank types with regards to their risk levels. In particular, higher cost efficiency is related to 
lower risk for conventional banks, which offers an affirmation to the notion that more efficient banks 
could be granted with a softer regulatory touch. The opposite is verified for Islamic banks, as the most 
efficient of these institutions seem to bear the highest risk.  
Higher cost efficiency is associated with lower capitalisation and vice versa for conventional banks, a 
result suggestive of a substitution effect between capitalisation and cost efficiency. However, the results 
for Islamic banks suggest that higher cost efficiency is associated with increased capitalisation; a 
complementary relationship. Hence, efficiency should be used with caution to gauge capital 
requirement levels particularly in countries where both bank types co-exist. This behaviour warrants 
interest from the AAOIFI and IFSB as well in that IBs attain higher cost efficiency due to higher capital 
requirements and as such if the rules are relaxed then the IBs might operate differently. Such reliance 
21 
 
on increased capital requirements leading to cost efficiency can be a double-edged sword for Islamic 
banks. The focus of banks should be to facilitate banking intermediation and increase financial inclusion 
and thus achieve efficiencies so that Islamic banking industry can maintain stable growth in the long 
run.  
Bank size positively affects insolvency risk of both bank types and is inversely related to the 
capitalisation of either bank; both effects are stronger in the case of Islamic banks. Real GDP growth 
reduces risk taking in conventional banks while the opposite result is reached for Islamic banks, which 
might be linked to the investments focus of Islamic banks being in the real economy. An inverse 
relationship between real GDP growth and capitalisation suggests that in good times capitalisation 
levels are reduced and banks channel more funds into investments. Capitalisation of Islamic banks is 
particularly affected by inflationary pressure, which is to be anticipated given the specifics of the profit-
and-loss sharing contracts that are utilised therein and cannot be inflation-linked or have varying 
maturities.  
Our findings are particularly relevant for regulators and policy makers in countries where both bank 
types operate. However, these may be generalised to those regulatory bodies who have substantially 
different bank types under their jurisdictions as they highlight the role of banking model in how banking 
risk may be impacted by capitalisation and efficiency. 
There are several limitations to our study. First, due to the scarcity of literature with regards to studies 
within the risk-efficiency- capital paradigm, it is difficult to derive or suggest how AAOFI and IFSB 
can make changes in their regulatory framework to impose and phase out and improvise upon the 
BASEL III regulations.   Another limitation is pertaining to the characteristic of the Islamic banking 
model; the fact that depositors or investment account holders in Islamic banks are considered to be 
investors who participate in profit and loss might have a positive or a negative effect on Islamic bank 
stability and efficiency.  
Future work could extend our research in various directions that could not be covered in this study. The 
first suggestion stems from one of the main findings of this study, it is observed that there is no trade-
off between capitalization and efficiency. This directs our attention to the fact that higher capital 
requirements indeed have a positive effect on the efficiency of IBs. What remains to be seen is if it is 
true for smaller sized banks as well. If increased capital requirements adversely affect the efficiency of 
small banks then regulators are posed with significant questions regarding the outcomes of adapting 
and implementing the Basel III framework for both Islamic and conventional banks in the regions where 
this study has been conducted. 
Another important suggestion is to investigate the capital requirements considering the weightings 
given to the capital adequacy ratio. This could help us evaluate the efficacy of the BASEL III accord.  
Table 1. Breakdown of banks by country and type.  
Country Islamic Conventional Total Islamic % 
Bahrain 12 5 17 70.59% 
Bangladesh 2 24 26 7.69% 
Egypt 2 19 21 9.52% 
Indonesia 1 31 32 3.13% 
Iran 12 0 12 100.00% 
Jordan 2 9 11 18.18% 
Kuwait 5 6 11 45.45% 
Malaysia 8 18 26 30.77% 
Pakistan 4 12 16 25.00% 
Qatar 3 5 8 37.50% 
Saudi Arabia 2 9 11 18.18% 
Tunisia 1 12 13 7.69% 
Turkey 3 15 18 16.67% 
UAE 8 15 23 34.78% 
Total 65 180 245 26.53% 
Notes: The table reports the study sample distributions by country and bank type. The sample period covers the period 2000 
- 2012. The cross-sectional subsamples reflect 65 IBs and 180 CBs operating in 14 countries. The column Islamic % denotes 
the percentage of banks in each country that correspond to Islamic banks. Data Source: Bankscope. 
Table 2. Description of variables. 
Panel A: Cost Efficiency estimation 
Variable Acronym Description 
Bank-specific variables   
Total Cost C Interest expense + personnel expenses + other 
administration expenses + other operating expenses 
Price of Physical Capital 𝑤1 Ratio of non-interest expenses (operating cost net of 
personnel expenses) to total fixed asset 
Price of Labour 𝑤2 Personnel expenses to total assets  
Price of Financial Capital 𝑤3 Interest expenses to total assets 
Net Total Loans 𝑦1 Total loans net of provision 
Other Earning Assets 𝑦2 Deposits & short-term funding other interest bearing 
liabilities+ other non-interest bearing liabilities 
Macroeconomic variables 
 
Market Concentration MCONC Assets of three largest banks to total assets of the sector  
Degree of monetization MONET Broad money supply (M2) divided by GDP 
GDP per Capita GDPPC Ratio of GDP to total population 
GDP growth GDPG Year-on-year logarithmic change real GDP 




Market Capitalization of listed companies as a % of 
GDP 
Annual inflation rate INF Year-on-year logarithmic change on Consumer Price 
Index 
Density of population DPOP Total inhabitant divided by area 
Panel B: Variables in SUR system of equations 
Insolvency Risk Z-score (𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠⁄ + 𝑅𝑂𝐴) 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)⁄  
Capitalisation CAP Equity to Total Assets 
Cost Efficiency CE Cost efficiency 
   
Bank-specific variables   
Bank Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
Tax to pre-tax profit TBPT Ratio of tax to pre-tax profits 
Net Loans to total assets NLTA Ratio of net loans to total assets 
Profitability  ROA Return on Assets 
Off-balance sheet activity OBSTA Ratio of off-balance-sheet items to total assets 
   
Market Structure variables   
Concentration MCONC Concentration ratio of the three largest banks. 
   
Macroeconomic variables   
Inflation INF Year-on-year logarithmic change on Consumer Price 
Index 
Real GDP growth GDPG Year-on-year logarithmic change on real GDP 
Notes: For panel A, the definitions used are consistent with previous studies as explained in the text. Following Berger and 
Mester (1997) all the cost, input price and output variables are normalized by the price of physical capital. Source: BankScope, 
IMF and World bank. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics by bank type.  
Variables  All banks Islamic banks Conventional banks 























Total Cost 6,050.30 11,877.42 5,934.47 11,730.12 6,083.56 11,921.88 
Price of Physical Capital (𝑤1) 3.552 32.328 10.370 67.613 1.590 4.127 
Price of Labour (𝑤2) 0.0124 0.0100 0.0126 0.0097 0.0123 0.0101 
Price of Financial Capital (𝑤3) 0.0365 0.0233 0.0297 0.0239 0.0385 0.0228 
Net Total Loans (𝑦1) 57,860.78 95,920.92 54,982.91 90,709.41 58,687.06 97,370.38 


















Z-score 18.748 18.810 16.860*** 25.631*** 19.290 16.301 
Capitalisation 0.1299 0.1156 0.1984*** 0.2031*** 0.1102 0.0602 
Cost efficiency  0.8131 0.2061 0.7295 0.2683*** 0.7331 0.1852 
Total Assets (SIZE) 107,228.9 172,346.8 92,447.62** 150,760.3*** 111,466.7 177,867.3 
TPBT 0.2223 0.9837 0.2482 0.3015*** 0.2148 1.1051 
ROA 0.0154 0.0415 0.0132 0.0583*** 0.0161 0.0352 
NLTA 0.4462 0.2591 0.1499*** 0.3048*** 0.5311 0.1654 
OBSTA 0.4563 3.0344 0.1902** 2.387*** 0.5160 3.4366 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively for the unconditional tests of equality between the means (t-test) and 
variances (Levene’s test) of Islamic versus conventional banks. 
 
Table 4. SUR regression estimates with Z-Score as a proxy for Risk 
 Equation 1  2  3 
 Model I II III  I II III  I II III 
  



















Z-score — — — 
 
0.647*** 0.620*** 0.574*** 
 
0.335*** 0.265*** 0.350***      
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital 18.808*** 41.867*** 49.214*** 
 
— — — 
 
-16.386*** -33.491*** -39.748***  
(0.040) (0.170) (0.170) 
     
(0.040) (0.160) (0.170) 
Efficiency 1.722*** 7.862*** 5.214*** 
 
-2.232*** -7.190*** -6.498*** 
 
— — —  
(0.020) (0.080) (0.080) 
 
(0.030) (0.070) (0.070) 
 
   
Size 1.314*** 1.015*** 0.925*** 
 
-0.825*** -0.639*** -0.308*** 
 
-0.464*** -0.152*** -0.481***  
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) 
TPBT -0.267*** -0.206*** -0.210*** 
 
0.197*** 0.182*** 0.210*** 
 
0.116*** 0.048*** 0.095***  
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NLTA 1.266*** 1.106*** 3.170*** 
     
    
(0.010) (0.030) (0.060) 
     
   
ROA 
    
-3.455*** -6.889*** -14.168*** 
 
        
(0.060) (0.120) (0.160) 
 
   
OBSTA 
        
0.019*** -0.008*** 0.000          










 MCONC 2.983*** 3.567*** 2.629*** 
 
-3.362*** -3.604*** -4.355*** 
 
1.218*** -0.317*** 1.789***  
(0.040) (0.100) (0.110) 
 
(0.040) (0.100) (0.100) 
 
(0.040) (0.070) (0.080) 
GDPGR 2.879*** 5.060*** -1.329*** 
 
-5.691*** -4.909*** -0.756* 
 
0.896*** -0.655*** -0.699**  
(0.140) (0.400) (0.390) 
 
(0.150) (0.360) (0.370) 
 
(0.100) (0.190) (0.220) 
INF -0.790*** -1.327*** 0.650*** 
 
0.930*** 0.926*** 0.432*** 
 
-1.345*** -2.079*** -3.074***  
(0.040) (0.110) (0.120) 
 
(0.040) (0.100) (0.110) 
 






















*** -0.172***      
 (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
IB x Capital — -34.117*** -39.463*** 
 
— — — 
 
— 27.632
*** 32.606***   
(0.190) (0.200) 
 
   
 
 (0.190) (0.200) 





— — —   
(0.160) (0.140) 
 
 (0.140) (0.130) 
 
   






***    
(0.120) 
 
  (0.110) 
 
  (0.080) 
IB x TPBT — — -1.370*** 
 
— — -0.079 
 
— — 0.450
***    
(0.080) 
 
  (0.070) 
 
  (0.050) 
IB x NLTA — — -2.214*** 
 
— — — 
 
— —     
(0.070) 
 
   
 
   





— —       
  (0.240) 
 
   
IB x OBSTA — — — 
 
— — — 
 
— — -0.069
***      
   
 
  (0.000) 






***    
(0.220) 
 
  (0.200) 
 
  (0.170) 





— — 0.120    
(0.840) 
 
  (0.800) 
 
  (0.470) 






***    
(0.210) 
 
  (0.200) 
 
  (0.120) 
IB 4.205*** 18.177*** 13.891*** 
 
-4.472*** -13.600*** -11.491*** 
 
1.163*** -1.092*** -0.449**  
(0.040) (0.120) (0.210) 
 
(0.030) (0.120) (0.180) 
 
(0.050) (0.100) (0.160)  
Observations 2736 2736 2736   2736 2736 2736   2736 2736 2736  
Sample period 2000-12 2000-12 2000-12   2000-12 2000-12 2000-12   2000-12 2000-12 2000-12 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis from the SUR estimation of the system of equations in section 3. 
Insolvency risk is proxied by the z-score, capital is proxied by the Equity to Assets ratio and Efficiency refers to cost efficiency derived from SFA (see 
section 3.1). Each equation is estimated as three models (labelled I, II and III) allowing for increasing distinctiveness between the two bank types. ***, **, * 









Table 5a. Robustness Test -  SUR regression estimates without Iran 
 Equation 1  2  3 
 Model I II III  I II III  I II III 
  



















Z-score — — — 
 
0.127*** -0.299*** 0.767*** 
 
0.123*** -0.610*** -0.187*** 
     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Capital 50.734*** 85.869*** 80.864*** 
 
— — — 
 
-40.003*** 91.776*** 41.516*** 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.17) 
     
(0.35) (0.69) (0.90) 
Efficiency -4.328*** -2.741*** -4.155*** 
 
-0.067 0.292 -15.542*** 
 
— — —  
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) 
 
(0.03) (0.17) (0.31) 
 
   
Size 1.601*** 0.343*** 0.683*** 
 
-0.140*** 0.199*** -0.180*** 
 
-1.313*** 0.795*** 0.354*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.04) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
TPBT -0.110*** -0.070*** -0.107*** 
 
0.024*** -0.006 0.445*** 
 
0.050** -1.042*** -0.493*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.04) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
NLTA 14.459*** 5.217*** 10.091*** 
 
— — — 
 
— — —  
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08) 
 
   
 
   
ROA — — — 
 
-3.008*** -0.315 -97.537*** 
 
— — —  
   
 
(0.12) (0.53) (1.22) 
 
   
OBSTA — — — 
 
— — — 
 
-0.376*** 0.542*** 0.340*** 
 
   
 
   
 










 MCONC 0.273*** 9.061*** 12.357*** 
 
-2.193*** 4.375*** -25.606*** 
 
17.668*** -19.436*** -5.729*** 
 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07) 
 
(0.05) (0.24) (0.50) 
 
(0.27) (0.30) (0.43) 
GDPGR 19.016*** 1.037*** 0.716** 
 
-0.944*** 2.482** 23.437*** 
 
1.822* 14.691*** 5.672*** 
 
(0.22) (0.14) (0.25) 
 
(0.18) (0.82) (1.65) 
 
(0.76) (0.88) (1.35) 
INF -8.241*** -1.192*** 1.372*** 
 
1.207*** -1.512*** 12.560*** 
 
-2.245*** -2.344*** -0.508 
 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08) 
 
(0.05) (0.23) (0.49) 
 























     
 (0.01) (0.01) 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
IB x Capital — -64.024*** -56.593*** 
 







   
 
 (0.85) (1.19) 





— — —   
(0.09) (0.16) 
 
 (0.51) (0.92) 
 
   







   
(0.02) 
 
  (0.11) 
 
  (0.12) 





— — -0.460    
(0.09) 
 
  (0.57) 
 
  (0.46) 
IB x NLTA — — -6.323*** 
 
— — — 
 
— —     
(0.12) 
 
   
 
   





— —       
  (1.87) 
 
   
IB x OBSTA — — — 
 




     
   
 
  (0.34) 







   
(0.19) 
 
  (1.29) 
 
  (1.13) 





— — 4.040    
(0.58) 
 
  (3.85) 
 
  (3.11) 





— — -0.134    
(0.14) 
 
  (0.93) 
 
  (0.78) 
IB 25.841*** 5.111*** 29.153*** 
 
1.881*** -9.977*** 14.135*** 
 
2.183*** -13.892*** 5.957*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.25) 
 
(0.03) (0.30) (1.54) 
 
(0.16) (0.23) (1.54) 
 
Observations 2631 2631 2631   2631 2631 2631   2631 2631 2631  
Sample period 2000-12 2000-12 2000-12   2000-12 2000-12 2000-12   2000-12 2000-12 2000-12 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis from the SUR estimation of the system of equations in section 3. 
Insolvency risk is proxied by the z-score, capital is proxied by the Equity to Assets ratio and Efficiency refers to cost efficiency derived from SFA (see section 
3.1). Each equation is estimated as three models (labelled I, II and III) allowing for increasing distinctiveness between the two bank types. ***, **, * denote 




Table 5b. Robustness Test - G2SLS random effects IV regression. G2SLS (IV-RE) 
 Equation 1  2  3 
 Model I II III  I II III  I II III 
  



















Z-score — — — 
 
0.017 0.018 0.019 
 
0.017** 0.100*** 0.118*      
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 




-3.620*** -7.257** -8.107***  
(23.09) (16.97) (18.17) 
     
(0.76) (2.44) (2.46) 
Efficiency 8.737 37.707 13.992 
 
-0.094 -0.121 -0.096 
 
—  —  
(200.43) (110.59) (108.69) 
 




Size -0.656 -1.875 -0.965 
 
0.002 0.003 0.010 
 
-0.059*** -0.100** -0.079**  
(6.97) (3.32) (0.78) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
TPBT -0.273* -0.316* -0.201 
 
0.005 0.005 0.004 
 
0.000 0.015 0.021  
(0.13) (0.14) (0.16) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) -0.079** 
NLTA -0.884 -8.969 -5.456 
     
 
   
(53.27) (30.65) (88.28) 




    
-0.011 0.053 -0.056 
 
—        
(0.63) (0.32) (0.63) 
 
—   
OBSTA 
        
0.002 0.003 0.003          










 MCONC 2.016 8.064 0.770 
 





(50.53) (34.60) (26.22) 
 
(0.10) (0.04) (0.07) 
 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.13) 
GDPGR -1.479 -11.587 2.193 
 
0.031 0.064 -0.073 
 
0.722* -0.121 -0.259  
(38.48) (29.25) (26.81) 
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.11) 
 
(0.30) (0.38) (0.42) 
INF 4.344 5.997 0.350 
 
-0.067 -0.003 0.006 
 
-0.390*** 0.074 0.045  
(4.92) (7.89) (7.68) 
 




















IB x Z-score — — — 
 




     
 (0.02) (0.03) 
 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
IB x Capital — 40.087** 40.594* 
 







   
 
 (2.45) (2.47) 
IB x Efficiency — -36.271 -12.201 
 
— 0.171 -0.001 
 
— — —   
(141.77) (108.80) 
 
 (0.19) (0.23) 
 
   
IB x Size — — -2.391 
 
— — -0.021 
 
— — 0.099    
(2.07) 
 
  (0.04) 
 
  (0.15) 





— — -0.011    
(1.16) 
 
  (0.01) 
 
  (0.09) 
IB x NLTA — — 3.442 
 
— — — 
 
— —     
(88.28) 
 
   
 
   
IB x ROA — — — 
 
— — 0.186 
 
— —       
  (0.64) 
 
   
IB x OBSTA — — — 
 
— — — 
 
— — -0.004      
   
 
  (0.01) 







   
(26.48) 
 
  (0.08) 
 
  (0.27) 





— — 0.041    
(27.94) 
 
  (0.15) 
 
  (0.77) 
IB x INF — — 15.195 
 
— — -0.017 
 
— — 0.046    
(8.04) 
 
  (0.03) 
 
  (0.22) 
IB -15.357 -11.078 -14.738 
 
0.161 0.301 0.356 
 
-0.224* 0.189 -0.449**  
(95.28) (59.95) (38.67) 
 
 
(0.29) (0.48) (1.74) 
 
(0.10) (0.29) (0.160)  
Observations 2736 2736 2736   2736 2736 2736   2736 2736 2736 
 R2 0.0525 0.0358 .0402  .0674 .0629 .0658  .0117 .0058 .0091 
 
Sample period 2000-12 2000-12 2000-12   2000-12 2000-12 2000-12   2000-12 2000-12 2000-12 
Notes: This table presents the results after using the Instrumental Variables (IV) approach to control for endogeneity. The table reports estimated coefficients and 
robust standard errors in parenthesis.  Nine equations are estimated by the three models (labelled I, II and III) allowing for increasing distinctiveness between the 





Table 5c. Robustness Test - SUR regression estimates with year Fixed Effects 
 Equation 1  2  3 
 Model I II III  I II III  I II III 
  























16.931*** -45.006*** -55.975*** 
      
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.12) (1.00) (0.25) 
Capital 17.632*** 89.518*** 65.552*** 
 
— — — 
 
-0.803*** 0.231*** 0.526*** 
 
(0.10) (0.29) (0.23) 
     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Efficiency -1.419*** 4.470*** 4.736*** 
 
1.012*** 1.894*** -5.701*** 
 
— — — 
 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10) 
 










0.545*** 0.006 -0.917*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
TPBT -0.258*** -0.092*** -0.159*** 
 
-0.160*** -0.028 0.153*** 
 
-0.317*** 0.433*** 0.135*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
NLTA 2.573*** 5.251*** 2.733*** 
 
— — — 
 
 
   
(0.04) (0.07) (0.09) 




    
1.880*** 1.896*** -16.581*** 
 
— — —      





        
0.041*** -0.283*** -0.006* 
         










 MCONC 2.740*** -2.224*** 1.489*** 
 
3.712*** 1.904*** -4.452*** 
 
-0.555*** 1.095* 3.653*** 
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
 
(0.13) (0.18) (0.13) 
 
(0.15) (0.47) (0.15) 
GDPGR 1.159*** 22.816*** -3.127*** 
 
-3.238*** 1.411 -1.931*** 
 
1.250*** -1.911 -1.824*** 
 
(0.30) (0.45) (0.47) 
 
(0.40) (0.85) (0.48) 
 
(0.38) (1.44) (0.37) 
INF -1.060*** -1.594*** 0.811*** 
 
-0.359*** -0.502* 0.083 
 
1.548*** 0.579 -4.359*** 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.14) 
 
(0.10) (0.23) (0.14) 
 






















     
 (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.01) (0.00) 
IB x Capital — -86.319*** -55.350*** 
 











 (1.17) (0.29) 





— — —   
(0.16) (0.16) 
 
 (0.23) (0.15) 
 
   














  (0.12) 
IB x TPBT — — -1.938*** 
 











  (0.07) 
IB x NLTA — — -1.760*** 
 
— — — 
 







   










   
IB x OBSTA — — — 
 









  (0.01) 












  (0.26) 














  (0.73) 














  (0.18) 
IB -1.236*** 25.368*** 13.777*** 
 
-5.146*** 0.324 -10.277*** 
 
-2.416*** 3.136*** -3.597*** 
 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.25) 
 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.23) 
 
(0.16) (0.45) (0.24) 
 
Observations 2736 2736 2736   2736 2736 2736   2736 2736 2736 
 Years Fixed Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Sample period 2000-12 2000-12 2000-12   2000-12 2000-
12 
2000-12   2000-12 2000-12 2000-12 
Notes:  The table reports estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis from the SUR estimation of the system of equations with year fixed effects in section 5.5. Insolvency 
risk is proxied by the z-score, capital is proxied by the Equity to Assets ratio and Efficiency refers to cost efficiency derived from SFA (see section 3.1). Each equation is estimated as three 





Table 5d. Robustness Test - SUR regression estimates with year Fixed Effects and  LLP/TL as a proxy for risk 
 Equation 1  2  3 
 Model I II III  I II III  I II III 
  



















LLP/TL — — — 
 
0.853*** -0.637*** -1.623*** 
 
0.174*** -0.716*** 0.554*** 
     
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital -0.764*** -0.040* -0.203*** 
 
— — — 
 
1.577*** 0.812*** 0.046 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
Efficiency -0.800*** -0.059*** -0.618*** 
 
1.632*** 0.065*** -0.665*** 
 
— — — 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 




Size 0.037*** -0.022*** -0.028*** 
 
-0.064*** 0.008*** -0.014*** 
 
0.020*** 0.036*** -0.003* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TPBT -0.007*** 0.003*** -0.001* 
 
0.007*** 0.003 -0.007*** 
 
0.009*** 0.020*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NLTA 0.171*** 0.040*** 0.136*** 
 
— — — 
 
— — — 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
     
 
  
ROA — — — 
 
0.298*** 0.068 0.268*** 
 
— — — 
     
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05) 
    
OBSTA — — — 
 
— — — 
 
0.000* 0.005*** -0.002*** 
         










 MCONC 0.011 0.327*** 0.702*** 
 
0.129*** -0.044* 0.689*** 
 
-0.058*** 0.066** 0.478*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDPGR 0.159*** -0.048 0.329*** 
 
-0.016 0.331*** 0.535*** 
 
-0.100*** -0.864*** 1.219*** 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) 
 
(0.02) (0.07) (0.06) 
INF -0.011 -0.063*** 0.014 
 
-0.103*** -0.019 0.094*** 
 
0.002 -0.183*** -0.033* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
















IB x  LLP/TL — — — 
 
— 0.481*** 0.781*** 
 
— 1.034*** -1.455*** 




IB x Capital — -3.887*** -2.667*** 
 











 (0.05) (0.04) 





— — —   
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
 
   







   
(0.01) 
 
  (0.02) 
 
  (0.02) 







   
(0.01) 
 
  (0.02) 
 
  (0.01) 
IB x NLTA — — -0.146*** 
 
— — — 
 
— — —    
(0.01) 
 
   
 
   
IB x ROA — — — 
 
— — 0.113 
 
— — —      
  (0.08) 
 
   
IB x OBSTA — — — 
 




     
   
 
  (0.00) 
IB x MCONC — — 0.032 
 




   
(0.02) 
 
  (0.04) 
 
  (0.03) 
IB x GDPGR — — 0.756*** 
 




   
(0.07) 
 
  (0.18) 
 
  (0.11) 







   
(0.02) 
 
  (0.04) 
 
  (0.03) 
IB 10.449*** 11.683*** 10.246*** 
 
-9.158*** 1.704*** 8.312*** 
 
-1.507*** -2.974*** 8.558*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
Observations 2736 2736 2736   2736 2736 2736   2736 2736 2736 
 Years Fixed Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Sample period 2000-12 2000-12 2000-12   2000-12 2000-12 2000-12   2000-12 2000-12 2000-12 
Notes:  The table reports estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis from the SUR estimation of the system of equations with year fixed effects in section 5.5. Insolvency 
risk is proxied by the LLP/TL, capital is proxied by the Equity to Assets ratio and Efficiency refers to cost efficiency derived from SFA (see section 3.1). Each equation is estimated as three 
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